Volume 29

Issue 2

Article 8

8-18-2022

Fastball Down the Middle- How Major League Baseball's Players
Association Can Hit a Homerun By Implementing Its Own Human
Equity Fund
Ryan Thomas

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Contracts Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports
Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ryan Thomas, Fastball Down the Middle- How Major League Baseball's Players Association Can Hit a
Homerun By Implementing Its Own Human Equity Fund, 29 Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports L.J. 475 (2022).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol29/iss2/8

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Villanova University Charles Widger
School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal by an
authorized editor of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

Thomas: Fastball Down the Middle- How Major League Baseball's Players Ass

FASTBALL DOWN THE MIDDLE – HOW MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL’S PLAYERS ASSOCIATION CAN HIT A
HOME RUN BY IMPLEMENTING ITS OWN
HUMAN EQUITY FUND
I. INTRODUCTION
The news broke on a Monday that yet another record-breaking
Major League Baseball contract was signed.1 The San Diego Padres
pledged themselves to a young up-and-coming superstar.2 Fernando Tatı́s Jr., whom they traded for just four and a half years
prior, signed a new deal with the Padres.3 The new deal is the longest in baseball history and would pay Tatı́s Jr. $340 million throughout the contract.4 San Diego was committing itself to another
fourteen years with the star shortstop.5 This deal was unique because Tatı́s Jr. signed it at such a young age compared to others
signing a major league contract.6 Underneath this deal, though,
was a contract many were unaware Tatı́s Jr. had already signed.7
1. See Dayn Perry & R.J. Anderson, Fernando Tatı́s Jr., Padres Agree to Mammoth
14-Year, $340 Million Contract Extension, CBS SPORTS (Feb. 22, 2021), https://
www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/fernando-tatis-jr-padres-agree-to-mammoth-14-year340-million-contract-extension/#:~:text=Fernando%20Tatı́s%20Jr.%20and
%20the%20San%20Diego%20Padres,years%20of%20the%20deal%2C%20according%20to%20Scott%20Miller [https://perma.cc/KVH3-XFS3] (“Fernando
Tatı́s Jr. and the San Diego Padres have agreed to a record-breaking 14-year extension, the club announced Monday.”).
2. See Jared Diamon, Fernando Tatı́s Jr., 22, Agrees to the Longest Baseball Contract
Ever with the Padres, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fernando-tatis-contract-san-diego-padres-11613622904?mod=Article_inline [https://
perma.cc/LM94-6552] (stating widely held view Tatı́s Jr. is star in league).
3. See Scott Merkin, Sale is Sold: Shields Dealt to White Sox, MLB (June 4, 2016),
https://www.mlb.com/news/white-sox-padres-complete-james-shields-tradec182092484 [https://perma.cc/Y54H-E3QN] (discussing trade involving Fernando Tatı́s Jr.).
4. See Perry, supra note 1 (“It will also become the third-largest contract
in MLB history in terms of total value behind just Mike Trout’s and Mookie Betts’
current deals. At 14 years, Tatı́s Jr.’s extension is the longest contract, which
breaks the record of 13 years shared by Giancarlo Stanton and Bryce Harper.”).
5. See Diamon, supra note 2 (stating Tatı́s Jr. will be Padre for life because of
his new contract).
6. See id. (“No player has ever received such a large contract this early in his
career.”).
7. See Jared Diamon, The Padres Owe Fernando Tatı́s Jr. $340 Million. He Owes an
Investment Fund Millions from His Payday., WALL ST. J. (Feb. 19, 2021), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/fernando-tatis-jr-340-million-investment-fund-padres11613732572?tesla=Y [https://perma.cc/D3C9-XW4K] (claiming Tatı́s Jr. may owe
up to $30 million to Big League Advance).
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When Tatı́s Jr. was an up-and-coming minor leaguer in the Padres organization, he signed a deal with an investment company
stipulating that the company would receive a portion of his future
earnings in exchange for an upfront cash payment.8 Tatı́s Jr.
signed the deal because he wanted to improve his financial situation while playing through the minor league system.9 However,
signing the deal now requires a substantial portion of Tatı́s Jr.’s record-setting contract to go to the investment company instead of
Tatı́s Jr.10 This deal was the product of an industry that has been
growing in athletics.11
The next frontier of business investments appears to be in the
sports world, through businesses that provide upfront money to
players in return for a share of their future profits.12 These compa8. See id. (discussing how deal with Big League Advance is Tatı́s Jr.’s most
important - most important what?); see also Weston Blasi, Fernando Tatı́s Jr.’s $340
Million Contract Will Be Shared with a Firm That Invested in Him When He Was a Teenager, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 18, 2021), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/fernando-tatis-jr-s-340-million-contract-will-be-shared-with-a-firm-that-invested-in-himas-a-teenager-11613679240#:~:text=When%20Tatı́s%2C%2022%2C%20was
%20a%20teenager%20playing%20Single-A,exchange%20for%20a%20percentage%20of%20their%20future%20earnings [https://web.archive.org/web/
20220101225506/https://www.marketwatch.com/story/fernando-tatis-jr-s-340-mil
lion-contract-will-be-shared-with-a-firm-that-invested-in-him-as-a-teenager-11613679
240] (“Players like Tatis then agree to give up anywhere between 1% and 12% of
future MLB earnings. The typical deal is for 8% of future earnings, but the firm
has not stated details of Tatis’s contract, according to Sportico. The contract applies to MLB earnings and not endorsements.”).
9. See Ken Rosenthal, Rosenthal: The Deal That Will Cost Fernando Tatı́s Jr. Part of
His Contract, ATHLETIC (Feb. 18, 2021), https://theathletic.com/2397422/2021/
02/18/fernando-Tatı́s-jr-padres-extension-big-league-advance-mlb/ [https://
perma.cc/UA4Y-MZ8A] (outlining Tatı́s Jr.’s plan to use BLA money to improve
his body for better prospect reaching major league team?).
10. See Jeff Sanders, Deal in 2017 Will Cost Fernando Tatı́s Jr. Millions, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB. (Feb. 20, 2021), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sports/padres/story/2021-02-19/fernando-tatis-big-league-advance-padres-michael-schwimer
[http://web.archive.org/web/20220331140422/https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sports/padres/story/2021-02-19/fernando-tatis-big-league-advance-padres-michael-schwimer] (“For every $50,000 advanced to a player, he gives up 1
percent of his future big-league earnings; the player owes the company nothing if
he never plays in the majors. If Tatı́s Jr. chose the maximum $500,000 — and BLA
does not disclose the particulars of its arrangements — his deal will put $34 million in BLA’s coffers over the next 14 years.”).
11. See Rosenthal, supra note 9 (stating BLA owner believes he is filling void
by helping players).
12. See Jake Seiner, Minor Leaguers Seek Investors, Donations to Make Ends Meet,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 4, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/minor-league-baseball-ap-top-news-mlb-baseball-az-state-wire-ac3fd2516c4a4f218f5ab311731cbe50
[https://web.archive.org/web/20220331014237/https://apnews.com/article/minor-league-baseball-ap-top-news-mlb-baseball-az-state-wire-ac3fd2516c4a4f218f5ab
311731cbe50] (discussing different businesses have started to function to help minor league players make additional money).
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nies seek returns on their investments by using advanced algorithms to formulate a player’s future earning potential.13 However,
some troubling developments have already occurred within this
new industry.14
These companies see themselves as helping underserved minor
league players.15 However, there are concerns about how they operate and whether they are having a positive impact on the players.16 For example, one agent who has expressed concern for these
businesses wants to present ideas to the Major League Baseball Players Association (“MLBPA”) addressing how to potentially handle
these businesses while protecting players.17
This Comment reviews potential options that the MLBPA
could implement to address concerns about this new industry.18 In
Section II, this Comment discusses the history and background of
the MLBPA, including a discussion of the development of venture
capital in sports contracts and some examples of prominent income-sharing contracts.19 Next, the Section provides some of the
legal background of options available to the MLBPA.20 In Section
III, this Comment looks to the failures of the current system, the
benefits of MLBPA intervention, and the feasibility and desirability
13. See Ken Rosenthal, Rosenthal: Company That Offers Minor Leaguers Up-Front
Payments Drawing Scrutiny Within Baseball, ATHLETIC (Apr. 20, 2018), https://
theathletic.com/322664/2018/04/20/rosenthal-company-that-offers-minor-leaguers-up-front-payments-drawing-scrutiny-within-baseball/ [https://perma.cc/5Q5VQ7M2] (“Schwimer said BLA uses a proprietary algorithm to value every player in
the minors.”).
14. See id. (stating three issues with these companies including: athlete exploitation, singling out Latin American players, excluding agents during first contact with athlete).
15. See Rosenthal, supra note 9 (“Schwimer, in contrast, believes he is providing a service to minor leaguers while they are still underpaid.”).
16. For further discussion of the issues raised about these companies, see infra
notes 117-137 and accompanying text.
17. See Ronald Blum, Moneyball: Tatı́s Took Cash as Prospect, Owes Part of Fortune,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 23, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/mlb-baseballmichael-schwimer-fernando-tatis-jr-fernando-tatis-db06c151fdf5a2650414b02447
509e8c [https://web.archive.org/web/20220331015407/https://apnews.com/article/mlb-baseball-michael-schwimer-fernando-tatis-jr-fernando-tatis-db06c151
fdf5a2650414b02447509e8c] (outlining plan Scott Boras developed to give greater
power to MLBPA).
18. For further discussion of the potential options open to the MLBPA, see
infra notes 162-206 and accompanying text.
19. For further discussion of the history and background of the MLBPA and
venture capital in sports, see infra notes 27–112 and accompanying text.
20. For further discussion of the relevant law surrounding the MLBPA’s options, see infra notes 56–87 and accompanying text.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository,

3

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [], Art. 8

478

JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29: p. 475

of the options open to the MLBPA.21 Section III continues with an
analysis of the potential sources of investment funds the MLBPA
could attempt to pursue and the laws restricting its access to these
funds.22
II. BACKGROUND
This section provides the necessary background to understand
how venture capital groups operate within minor league baseball.23
Subsection A discusses the interaction between the MLBPA and minor league baseball.24 Subsection B explains the role of venture
capitalists in sports.25 Subsection C then explains relevant law that
may apply to a venture capitalist investing in minor leaguers, broken down by the source of income a player may receive.26
A.

Major League Baseball Players Association

Professional baseball players not on a major league roster play
for the major league teams’ minor league affiliates.27 The major
league teams pay the minor league players’ salaries and any additional food costs they may incur during the season.28 Minor league
baseball has six different competitive levels, and pay is commensurate with each respective level.29 When drafted to the minor
21. For further discussion of the failures of the current system, see infra notes
117-137 and accompanying text.
22. For further discussion of the potential finance sources to fund a new company, see infra notes 162–196 and accompanying text.
23. For further discussion of the background of venture capital group operations within minor league baseball, see infra notes 27–112 and accompanying text.
24. For further discussion of the interaction between the MLBPA and minor
league baseball, see infra notes 27–36 and accompanying text.
25. For further discussion of the role of venture capital in sports, see infra
notes 37–55 and accompanying text.
26. For further discussion of the relevant laws that may apply to a venture
capitalist firm investing in minor leaguers, see infra notes 56–87 and accompanying text.
27. See Robert Pannullo, The Struggle for Labor Equality in Minor League Baseball:
Exploring Unionization, 34 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 443, 444–46 (2020) (“With only
1,200 players in MLB, the 6,000-plus minor league players represent the majority
of all professional baseball players.”).
28. See id. at 446 (stating MLB owners pay salaries, food expenses, make roster
decisions for promotions and releases of players, and control contracts of minor
league players and coaches).
29. See id. (“At the lowest levels . . . players are paid $1,100 per month. At the
highest level . . . players can earn $ 2,150 per month. [P]layers are paid only
during the five-month regular season; they are not paid during spring training and
cannot earn overtime wages.”).
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leagues, some baseball players are offered lofty signing bonuses30;
however, most players do not sign these lofty signing bonuses because the players are not offered these bonuses by the team and are
therefore underpaid relative to the poverty level in the United
States.31
After three failed attempts, major league baseball players unionized in 1966 and formed their first collective bargaining agreement in 1968—posing a potential solution to under compensation
of major league players.32 The newly formed players association
achieved substantial success in establishing minimum salaries, a
process to hear grievances by players, and an unrestricted free
agency.33 However, the MLBPA does not represent any minor
league baseball players’ interests.34 As a result, the MLBPA has
used issues affecting minor league players to gain more for major
league players.35 There is a fear within the MLBPA that representation is a zero-sum game such that vying for minor leaguers and
their interests directly detracts from effectively representing major
league players.36

30. See Jim Callis, Here Are ‘21 Draft Bonus Pools, Pick Values, MLB (May 27,
2021), https://www.mlb.com/news/2021-mlb-draft-bonus-slots#:~:text=IN
%202019%2C%20teams%20set%20a%20record%20with%20%24316%2C560
%2C984,%248%2C416%2C300%2C%20which%20was%20%241%2C000
%20more%20than%20the%20allotment [https://perma.cc/J9VH-9SQB] (stating
first overall pick this coming year can earn signing bonus just over $8.4 million).
31. See Pannullo, supra note 27, at 447–48 (2020) (“The median signing bonus for players drafted in 2016, however, was $50,000, with over forty percent of
players earning less than $10,000 and twenty percent earning less than $1,000.”).
32. See id. at 450 (finding the players attempted to form union in 1885, 1914,
1946, and succeeded in forming one in 1966).
33. See id. (“Within his first eight years as head of the MLBPA, Miller helped
the players achieve groundbreaking goals, including league minimum salaries, an
arbitration process for grievances, and unrestricted free agency for players.”).
34. See id. at 451 (finding MLBPA has no duty to represent minor league players because they are not in MLBPA unit).
35. See Garrett R. Broshuis, Touching Baseball’s Untouchables: The Effects on Minor League Baseball Players, 4 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 51, 55 (2013) (“In fact, the
two most recent CBAs have established a disturbing trend in which the MLBPA
concedes a bargaining chip with negative effects for minor leaguers in order to
achieve something positive for major leaguers.”).
36. See Bill Shaikin, Minor League Baseball Players Exploring Union as They Continue to Battle Low Wages, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Sept. 15, 2018), https://
www.latimes.com/sports/mlb/la-sp-mlb-column-20180915-story.html [https://
web.archive.org/web/20220331020055/https://www.latimes.com/sports/mlb/lasp-mlb-column-20180915-story.html] (discussing MLBPA viewpoint that minor
league player negotiations subtract from whole pie major league players can take
from).
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B. Venture Capital in Sports Contracts
To combat the smaller income of many minor league players,
some players turn to venture capitalists.37 Baseball is not the first
sport to experience investment contracts for future return on upfront investments on its athletes.38 Golfers, tennis players, and
poker players have signed these agreements as a way to jumpstart
their training and careers.39 For example, in poker, players get
backers to put up their entrance fee, and then backers receive a
portion of the poker player’s winnings.40 Additionally, golf and tennis players have to pay lofty entrance fees and yearly travel fees, so
they similarly encourage investors to foot the bill and receive part
of the players’ winnings in return.41 However, baseball was not
privy to such agreements until 2008.42 The first attempt at creating
future income agreements looked substantially similar to a stock exchange where one could purchase a share in the athlete’s “stock”
for the ability to retain a certain percentage of their future
income.43
Since 2007, multiple types of income-sharing agreement companies have formed specific to baseball.44 The first type of incomesharing agreement acts like a stock exchange, where an Initial Public Offering (“IPO”) occurs, and the price can fluctuate throughout
37. For further discussion of baseball players who entered into these types of
contracts see infra notes 102–112 and accompanying text.
38. See Jeff Schwartz, The Corporatization of Personhood, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV.
1119, 1128 (2015) (stating equity investment is more prominent in sports than any
other sector).
39. See id. (“Junior golfers and tennis players . . . have been known to accept
money from investors in exchange for a share in their future earnings. Poker players have similar arrangements; investors may provide all or part of the entry fee for
a specific tournament in exchange for a share of the prize money.”).
40. See Alexandra Berzon, Full House: $1 Million Hold ‘Em Ante, WALL ST. J.
(June 30, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304830704577
496963159635408 [https://perma.cc/6XC5-ZLGY] (discussing poker players using investors to pay $1 million entrance fee for poker tournament).
41. See Roy Furchgott, For Sports Investors, Dividends May Be Ringside Seats, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 29, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/29/business/forsports-investors-dividends-may-be-ringside-seats.html [https://perma.cc/TAU7SB7D] (“Professional golfers need about $75,000 a year to travel and play in tournaments; bowlers require $30,000 to $45,000. Tennis players need about $70,000
for travel, tournament costs and outlays for coaches.”).
42. See Schwartz, supra note 38, at 1128 (finding Randy Newsom’s 2008 contract was first equity contract signed by baseball player).
43. See id. (“On his website, Real Sports Investments, he attempted to raise
$50,000 by selling 2500 shares of himself for $20 apiece. Each share would entitle
the holder to 0.002% of his pay should he make it to the major league.”).
44. For further discussion of companies involved in income sharing agreements, see infra notes 45–55 and accompanying text.
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the player’s career.45 These funds operate similarly to the stock exchange for companies, the difference being that the stock represents an individual’s potential income, not a company’s potential
profitability.46 Another type of income-sharing agreement is
formed when players pool together, allowing many minor league
players to receive a future portion of their pool-mate’s earnings if
they make it professionally.47 Finally, hedge fund-type companies
have invested in particular players in exchange for a portion of
their future earnings.48
One of the more prominent investment companies in Minor
League Baseball is Big League Advance, LLC (“BLA”).49 In 2016,
BLA was formed by a former Major League player, Michael
Schwimer.50 BLA uses analytics to determine the best players to
invest in and “[p]layers choose what percentage of their future career earnings they want to give Big League Advance.”51 In exchange, BLA gives the player an upfront lump sum of money that
players may utilize at their discretion.52 Players have no obligation
to pay anything back to BLA unless they make it to the major
45. See Nicole Medeiros, Note, From Sports Stadiums to the Stock Exchange: The
Economic Agency Costs of Fantex’s Income-Share Agreements with Professional Athletes, 13
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 373, 374 (2015) (reviewing Fantex’s success in securing professional athletes and launching their IPOs on their exchange).
46. See Jason Fernando, Initial Public Offering (IPO), INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 30,
2021), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/ipo.asp [https://perma.cc/GXC5X693] (describing how SEC regulates IPOs, with IPO being offered to be part
owner of business, allowing company to receive funds in exchange for ownership
stake).
47. See Tom Goldman & Kenny Malone, Some Baseball Players Are Entering ‘Income Pooling’ Agreements To Fix Imbalance, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 25, 2019), https:/
/www.npr.org/2019/10/25/773532516/some-baseball-players-are-entering-income-pooling-agreements-to-fix-imbalance [https://perma.cc/426K-6YED] (“Nobody has to pay a cent until they’ve made it to the majors and they’ve made $1.6
million. Then that guy has to kick 10% of his salary back to his pool mates.”).
48. See Player Investment, BIG LEAGUE ADVANCE, https://bigleagueadvance.
com/minor-league-player-investment/ [https://perma.cc/T5DM-VYMH] (last visited Feb. 8, 2022) (discussing BLA’s purpose in providing minor league baseball
players with money to pursue their dream).
49. See Elizabeth Strom, Big League Advance “Invests” in Prospects. Some Find
That Problematic., SBNATION D R A Y S B A Y (Sept. 3, 2018), https://
www.draysbay.com/2018/9/3/17814788/big-league-advance-invests-in-prospectssome-find-that-problematic [https://perma.cc/8UNE-6GN5] (“BLA seems to be
the first to specialize in minor league baseball players.”).
50. See Player Investment, supra note 48 (showing BLA has several members on
staff, including owner, who played minor league baseball or worked in baseball).
51. See id. (discussing BLA use of analytics to find players).
52. See id. (“Players receive an upfront investment from Big League Advance
in exchange for an agreed upon percentage of their future Major League
earnings.”).
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leagues.53 BLA operates with the expectation that most of their investments will not come to fruition, but its hope is that one or two
players sign a multi-million dollar major league contract which will
more than make up for the losses on its other investments.54 When
a player does make it to the professional level, BLA expects immediate payment.55
C. Relevant Laws
1. Hedge Fund Laws
Hedge funds are an investment tool used by wealthy individuals that can be regulated by the Securites Exchange Commision
(“SEC”).56 A hedge fund is an investment instrument where investors pool their money together, and a fund manager directs the
investment money into high-return investments.57 These funds
provide more freedom to invest aggressively and more diversely
than other fund options.58 Hedge funds can bypass a lot of government oversight if they fall outside of the Investment Company Act
of 1940 (“ICA”).59 The ICA restricts the types of investments that a
fund can make, so it is paramount for hedge funds’ success to avoid
falling under this law—otherwise, any MLBPA’s hedge fund would
have to comply with the ICA’s restrictions.60
53. See id. (stating players who do not reach professional levels do not owe any
money to fund).
54. See id. (“[W]e expect that we will lose money on the vast majority of players we sign. It is extremely difficult to predict which minor league players will end
up becoming successful Major League players. More than 90% of minor league
players will never play a single day in the Major Leagues. Even top ranked prospects have a hard time making it to the Major Leagues. To illustrate that point,
from 2009–2013, 54 players that were ranked as a team’s #1 or #2 prospect, AND
were top 100 overall prospects, are either out of baseball or unlikely to make it to
arbitration.”).
55. See Complaint at 4, Mejı́a v. Big League Advance Fund I LP, No. 1:18-cv00296 (D. Del. Aug. 31, 2018) (stating BLA representative showed up at Mejı́a’s
home in Dominican Republic expecting payment on Mejı́a’s professional salary).
56. For further discussion of the laws impacting hedge funds, see infra notes
57–68 and accompanying text.
57. See Sham Gad, Guide to Hedge Funds, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 4, 2021), https://
www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/102113/what-are-hedge-funds.asp
[https://perma.cc/3AMT-5KPB] (stating hedge fund is just investors bringing
their money together in order to invest funds from common pool of money).
58. See id. (“A hedge fund is just a fancy name for an investment partnership
that has freer rein to invest aggressively and in a wider variety of financial products
than most mutual funds.”).
59. See 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 80a-1–(b)(8) (LexisNexis 2018) (directing SEC to regulate companies that put themselves out as companies that invest, reinvest, or trade
in securities).
60. See id. (stating ICA places restrictions on what investments companies can
make).
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Hedge funds are usually exempt from coverage under the ICA
when they have less than one hundred beneficial owners and they
only offer their securities to private investors.61 Another way hedge
funds can ensure they do not fall under the ICA is if their investors
are all qualified purchasers or institutions.62 When hedge funds are
not covered under the ICA, they can invest in a larger variety of
types of investments.63 It also allows them to forego compliance
with regulatory compliance requirements with the SEC.64
The Investment Advisors Act of 1940 (“IAA”), created additional restrictions on registration with the SEC for the investor of a
fund.65 The IAA outlines which advisers need to be registered with
states.66 It also outlines which advisers need to be registered with
the SEC.67 This is based on the asset levels included in the fund
and could produce additional restrictions and regulatory burdens
for the advisors that qualify under this law.68
61. See id. § 80a-3(c)(1) (“Any issuer whose outstanding securities (other than
short-term paper) are beneficially owned by not more than one hundred persons
(or, in the case of a qualifying venture capital fund, 250 persons) and which is not
making and does not presently propose to make a public offering of its
securities.”).
62. See id. § 80a-3(c)(7)(A) (“Any issuer, the outstanding securities of which
are owned exclusively by persons who, at the time of acquisition of such securities,
are qualified purchasers, and which is not making and does not at that time propose to make a public offering of such securities. Securities that are owned by
persons who received the securities from a qualified purchaser as a gift or bequest,
or in a case in which the transfer was caused by legal separation, divorce, death, or
other involuntary event, shall be deemed to be owned by a qualified purchaser,
subject to such rules, regulations, and orders as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”).
63. See Gad, supra note 57 (explaining hedge funds are able to invest in different types of assets than mutual funds).
64. See Goldstein v. S.E.C., 451 F.3d 873, 875 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Such companies are, for example, foreclosed from trading on margin or engaging in short
sales, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(a)(1), (3), and must secure shareholder approval to take
on significant debt or invest in certain types of assets, such as real estate or commodities, id. § 80a-13(a)(2). These transactions are all core elements of most
hedge funds’ trading strategies.” (internal citation omitted)).
65. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3a (West 2019) (outlining requirements creating
duty to register for adviser).
66. See id. § 80b-3a(a)(1)(A)-(B) (prohibiting advisers from registering under
80b-3 unless they have at least $25 million in assets or amount deemed
appropriate).
67. See id. § 80b-3a(b) (describing which advisers this regulation applies to).
68. See Andriy Blokhin, Are Hedge Funds Registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), I N V E S T O P E D I A (Apr. 24, 2021), https://
www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/101415/are-hedge-funds-registered-securities-and-exchange-commission-sec.asp#:~:text=hedge%20funds%20are%20typically%20required%20to%20register%20with,limit%20is%20raised%20to%20
%24150%20million%201%20%EF%BB%BF [https://perma.cc/NR8S-VYWJ]
(outlining specific asset levels triggering additional oversight from state, federal
agencies for adviser).
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2. The Use of Pension Fund Monies
Pension funds, seek ways to receive a return on the monies provided by those covered by the fund.69 A pension plan is a retirement instrument that provides retirees a fixed income for life, and
is administered by a business or labor union.70 The body responsible for administering the pension plan, called the plan fiduciary, is
responsible for managing the plan’s investments.71 These plans are
set up to vest after a certain amount of time.72 They base the payment in the plan off of service time, age at retirement, and the
amount of compensation received.73
Fiduciaries are required to comply with the responsibilities of
fiduciaries laid out in trust law, and therefore can be held personally responsible for investments that do not pass the required
tests.74 The Supreme Court has noted “[a]n ERISA fiduciary must
discharge his responsibility ‘with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence’ that a prudent person ‘acting in a like capacity and familiar
with such matters’ would use.”75 This means prudent investments
must be made in the context of the whole portfolio and done with
“reasonable care, skill, and caution.”76 One particularly important
69. For further discussion of the laws impacting the use of pension fund monies, see infra notes 70–78 and accompanying text.
70. See Dana Anspach, What is a Pension?, BALANCE (Jan. 22, 2022), https://
www.thebalance.com/what-is-a-pension-and-how-do-you-get-one-2388766#:~:
text=key%20Takeaways%201%20A%20pension%20is%20a%20retirement,compensation%2C%20and%20age%20at%20retirement.%20More%20items. . .%20
[https://perma.cc/4BLS-KZ48] (explaining pensions are set up and run by
employers).
71. See id. (stating whoever runs plan funds also manages benefits), see also
Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 575 U.S. 523, 528 (2015) (finding law of trusts is source for
determining ERISA fiduciary’s requirements).
72. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(21)(A) (West 2019) (“[A] person is a fiduciary with
respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or
control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any
moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do
so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the
administration of such plan.”).
73. See Anspach, supra note 70 (describing elements used to determine
eligibility).
74. See Fiduciary Responsibilities, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/health-plans/fiduciaryresp [https://perma.cc/QUA9-DP5R] (last visited Jan. 14, 2021) (“Fiduciaries who do not follow these principles of conduct may
be personally liable to restore any losses to the plan, or to restore any profits made
through improper use of plan assets.”).
75. See id. (quoting 29 U.S.C.S. § 1104 (LexisNexis 2021)) (clarifying fiduciaries’ duty to reevaluate funds composition).
76. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90(a) (Am. L. Inst. 2007) (stating
investment decision should reflect trusts overall strategy).
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rule is the “exclusive benefit rule.”77 Under an ERISA pension
plan, “[t]he fiduciary ‘shall discharge his duties with respect to a
plan solely in the interest of the beneficiaries and . . . for the exclusive purpose of . . . providing benefits to participants and their
beneficiaries.’”78
3. Union Dues
Another area in which the MLB can get involved in minor
league players’ financial situation is through union dues, which unions receive from their members and which helps the union conduct its business.79 Members of a union are supposed to pay union
dues.80 Union dues go towards much of the administrative costs of
running a union and paying these helps ensure the union can function as an entity.81 The dues are usually a fraction of the total wages
made or a set monthly rate.82 The business can set aside the percent of the wage that goes to union dues, or the employee must pay
their monthly fee.83
However, union dues, restrictions, and disclosure requirements can be regulated heavily.84 Federal laws, state laws, and opinions from the court direct this area of the law.85 The National
Labor Relations Act is the primary federal law that affects this
area.86 The Supreme Court has also weighed in on which activities
77. See Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction:
The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (discussing major flaws of
this rule, including how it impacts fiduciaries’ abilities to invest pension funds).
78. See id. at 1109 (outlining requirement for fiduciaries).
79. For further discussion of the laws impacting the use of union dues, see
infra 80–87 and accompanying text.
80. See Megan McRobert, Union Dues Explained, UNIT. (Mar. 3, 2021), https://
guide.unitworkers.com/union-dues-explained/ [https://perma.cc/X6BD-D82R]
(explaining members of union pay dues regularly for being member).
81. See id. (describing some activities union dues get paid for).
82. See id. (explaining percentage break-down for certain unions dues).
83. See id. (noting some unions’ methods for calculating union dues).
84. See Union dues, NAT’L LAB. RELATIONS BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/aboutnlrb/rights-we-protect/the-law/employees/union-dues [https://perma.cc/QAV5C5VL] (last visited Sept. 23, 2021) (“Federal law allows unions and employers to
enter into ‘union-security’ agreements which require all employees in a bargaining
unit to become union members and begin paying union dues and fees within 30
days of being hired . . . . If you work in a state that bans union-security agreements,
(27 states), each employee at a workplace must decide whether or not to join the
union and pay dues, even though all workers are protected by the collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the union.”).
85. See id. (stating collection of union dues are subject to federal laws, state
laws, court rulings).
86. See Harry Hutchinson, Reclaiming The Labor Movement Through Union Dues?
A Postmodern Perspective In The Mirror Of Public Choice Theory, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 447, 456 (2000) (“On the other hand, despite this decision, employee Beck
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a union can use their members’ dues, narrowly construing union
dues as designated for activities “necessary to ‘performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with
the employer on labor-management issues.’”87
D. Prominent Income-sharing Contracts
Several well-known American professional athletes have signed
some type of income-sharing contract.88 Most of these players are
in the NFL and MLB, and they are primarily involved in venture
capital and stock exchange-type funds.89 This section provides examples of income-sharing contracts held by well-known players, in
both the NFL and the MLB.90
1. NFL Contracts
Several football players have signed contracts that provide a
share of their income to investors.91 Two players of note are
Vernon Davis, who played for the San Francisco 49ers when he
signed his investment-sharing deal, and Kendall Wright, who played
for the Tennessee Titans when he signed his own deal.92 Vernon
rights have not been enforced uniformly by the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) or the President of the United States.”).
87. See Commc’n Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 739 (1988) (reviewing
union’s use of nonunion employees’ dues for activities not connected to collective
bargaining); see also id. at 762-63 (quoting Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., 466 U.S. 435,
448 (1984)) (restricting union dues collected or expended to those activities used
exclusively for bargaining activities).
88. See Jordan Moore, Human Capital Equity Returns: Evidence from the National
Football League, SSRN (Apr. 26, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3587424 [https:/
/perma.cc/T2CG-JRD7] (“Between April 2014 and April 2016, in which ten active
players in the National Football League (NFL) [sold] equity claims to their future
labor income.”); see also Blum, supra note 17 (discussing how Tatı́s Jr. is son of
former baseball player while explaining how he will pay BLA portion of his salary).
89. See Moore, supra note 88, at 1 (“The proceeds from the [IPOs of these
equity] contracts total more than $38 million and value the human capital of these
athletes at more than $357 million.”); see also Blum, supra note 17 (stating BLA has
signed many players who have yet to make MLB roster).
90. For further discussion of the NFL players with these contracts, see infra
notes 91–101 and accompanying text.
91. See Moore, supra note 88, at 2 (“Between April 2014 and April 2016, six
active players in the National Football League (NFL) sold equity claims on a percentage of their future labor income to Fantex, a private firm.”).
92. See Tom Zanki, Fantex Primes 6th Football Player Brand’s $2.7M IPO, LAW360
(June 24, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/671903/fantex-primes-6th-football-player-brand-s-2-7m-ipo [https://perma.cc/9AKM-WQCA] (discussing major
offerings, including Vernon Davis, E.J. Manuel, Mohamed Sanu, Alshon Jeffery,
and Michael Brockers); see also Complaint at 3, Fantex, Inc. v. Wright, CGC-1856355U (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 6, 2018) (“Under the Brand Agreement entered into
between Fantex and Wright . . . Fantex purchased an interest in . . . Wright’s
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Davis is one of the few players who has spoken about his deal with
Fantex, LLC (“Fantex”), which makes IPO-style investments for
players’ future income.93 The details of Vernon Davis’s incomesharing agreement were revealed when Davis spoke about his contract with Fantex.94 Davis revealed that he signed away ten percent
of his future earnings in exchange for a $4 million IPO.95 His deal
with Fantex stipulated that he would provide Fantex with a portion
of the income he received from his players contract and other incomes including “corporate endorsements and appearance fees
. . . .”96
A less rosy example can be seen with Kendall Wright, who was
sued by Fantex for not paying his share of the income agreement
that he signed with the company.97 Kendall Wright’s contract, on
the other hand, was only revealed after he was sued by Fantex.98
The lawsuit came after Wright attempted to forego payment of
Fantex’s apportionment of his income.99 Wright’s contract provided him with $3.1 million upfront for ten percent of his future
earnings.100 The court upheld the validity of the income-sharing
‘Brand Income’ consisting of ‘Gross Monies’ payable to Wright as a result of his
activated in the ‘Field’ . . . .”).
93. See William Alden, Vernon Davis Breaks His Silence Over Fantex I.P.O., N.Y.
TIMES (June 4, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/04/vernon-davisbreaks-his-silence-over-fantex-i-p-o/?mtrref=search.yahoo.com&gwh=C7479C194
D417E208D54C93DD88342A6&gwt=regi&assetType=REGIWALL [http://
web.archive.org/web/20220331141253/https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/
04/vernon-davis-breaks-his-silence-over-fantex-i-p-o/?mtrref=search.yahoo.com
&gwh=C7479C194D417E208D54C93DD88342A6&gwt=regi&asset
Type=REGIWALL] (discussing SEC requirement stopped Vernon Davis from commenting on IPO). For further discussion of an IPO, see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
94. See Medeiros, supra note 45, at 378 (analyzing how Fantex pays players in
exchange for future stake in their lifetime earnings).
95. See Alden, supra note 93 (“Mr. Davis received $4 million through the
I.P.O., which sold 421,100 shares and raised $4.2 million from investors.”). For
further discussion of an IPO, see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
96. See Alden, supra note 93 (discussing deal did not include income unrelated to his brand).
97. See Complaint at 3, Fantex, Inc., CGC-18-56355U (“Wright is obligated to
pay the amounts due to Fantex within 15 days after his receipts of such ‘Brand
Income’ amounts.”).
98. For further discussion of how the contract was revealed, see supra note 97
and accompanying text.
99. See Complaint at 3, Fantex, Inc., CGC-18-56355U (arguing Wright did not
uphold his contract by not properly paying Fantex for part of his earnings).
100. See Tim Daniels, Kendall Wright Ordered to Pay Nearly $400,000 in Fantex
Suit, BLEACHER REP. (Aug. 18, 2018), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/
2791557-kendall-wright-ordered-to-pay-nearly-400000-in-fantex-suit [https://
perma.cc/LA2R-745F] (“Fantex . . . filed a successful lawsuit alleging Wright failed
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contract and required Wright to pay the balance of what he owed to
Fantex.101
2.

MLB Contracts

The more famous agreements that have been made in professional baseball that involve an income-sharing agreement include
the agreement signed by Fernando Tatı́s Jr. of the San Diego Padres
and the agreement signed by Francisco Mejı́a, who currently plays
for the Tampa Bay Rays.102 Both of these agreements were signed
with BLA, but they have made headlines for different reasons.103
Tatı́s Jr. signed his agreement with BLA to help pay for significant
expenses he thought necessary for future success in the major
leagues, such as nutritionists and personal trainers.104 Like all BLA
agreements, his contract is subject to privacy provisions, making it
difficult to know precisely how much of his new contract is
earmarked for BLA.105
Another well-known BLA contract is known for more infamous
and controversial reasons.106 Francisco Mejı́a is currently a catcher
with the Tampa Bay Rays.107 Mejı́a filed a lawsuit in 2018 against
BLA, which the United States District Court for the District of Delato pay after he agreed to a contract of $3.1 million for 10 percent of his future
earnings.”).
101. See Fantex, Inc. v. Wright, 2018 Cal. Super. LEXIS 5206, at 6(a)(6) (Cal.
Super. Ct. 2018) (finding in favor of Fantex, awarding damages of $386,055.83).
102. See Blum, supra note 17 (discussing aspects of deal Tatı́s Jr. signed, including impact of deal for BLA); see also Rick Archer, MLB Player Says Fund Made
‘Unconscionable’ Loan Deal, LAW360 (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1033493/mlb-player-says-fund-made-unconscionable-loan-deal [https://
perma.cc/J73E-9RSX] (discussing details in lawsuit against BLA including arguments raised in complaint); see also Francisco Mejı́a, BASEBALL REFERENCE, https://
www.baseball-reference.com/players/m/mejiafr01.shtml [https://perma.cc/
6SRR-V34W] (last visited Aug. 28, 2021) (showing Francisco Mejı́a playing for
Tampa Bay Rays, noting his stats for his career).
103. For further discussion of Mejı́a’s and Tatı́s Jr.’s income-sharing contracts,
see infra notes 104–112 and accompanying text.
104. See Blum, supra note 17 (“Tatı́s Jr. told The Athletic in 2018 he signed
the BLA deal at first to afford a personal trainer, higher quality food and better
housing.”).
105. See id. (discussing how Mejı́a’s contract became available because of lawsuit he filed against BLA).
106. See Archer, supra note 102 (“Cleveland Indians catcher Francisco Mejı́a,
in a Delaware federal court suit claiming an ex-Major Leaguer’s investment fund
induced him to sign away more than 10 percent of his lifetime earnings in exchange for a $360,000 loan, was hit with a counterclaim Thursday claiming his suit
breached a confidentiality clause in the agreement.”).
107. See BASEBALL REFERENCE, supra note 102 (showing Francisco Mejı́a playing for Tampa Bay Rays and noting stats for his career).
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ware ultimately dismissed with prejudice.108 However, in the lawsuit, Mejı́a allegedly “received $360,000 as part of agreements in
which Mejı́a agreed to repay the company 10% of future
earnings.”109
Mejı́a accused BLA of creating an unconscionable contract and
targeting players who were comparatively less educated than
others.110 Mejı́a’s lawsuit alleges BLA approached Mejı́a when he
needed “to pay for medical treatments for his ailing mother.”111
The suit also alleged a great deal of other issues that are cause for
concern, such as the lack of a translator present during the negotiation and conflict of interest issues with BLA’s attorney.112
III. ANALYSIS
Both players and agents have expressed concern over the current system that has allowed for the growth of these income-sharing
contracts.113 MLBPA intervention could potentially bring about significant benefit to the organization.114 To enjoy those benefits, the
MLBPA would need to implement a new plan in accordance with
applicable statutory regimes.115 This section first explores failures
of the current system, then explains the benefits to the MLBPA of
implementing their own system, and finally provides the MLBPA
with potential options for implementing their own fund.116
108. See Order Granting Stipulation of Dismissal, Mejı́a v. Big League Advance
Fund I LP, No. 1:18-cv-00296 (D. Del. August 31, 2018), ECF No. 38 (granting
BLA’s stipulation for dismissal of lawsuit with prejudice).
109. See id. (outlining details of contract Mejı́a signed).
110. See Complaint at 5, Mejı́a, No. 1:18-cv-00296 (alleging contract was unconscionable because, among other reasons, BLA “[e]xploit[ed] . . . the underprivileged, unsophisticated, uneducated and the illiterate”).
111. Id. (complaining Mejı́a was targeted because his mother needed medical
treatments, BLA knew Mejı́a did not speak any English, and BLA knew Mejı́a was
not highly educated).
112. For further discussion of the issues raised in Mejı́a’s lawsuit, see infra
notes 132–137 and accompanying text.
113. For further discussion of the failures of the current system, see infra
notes 117–137 and accompanying text.
114. For further discussion of the benefits of a new system, see infra notes
138–161 and accompanying text.
115. For further discussion of the relevant laws surrounding the MLBPA’s options, see supra notes 56–87 and accompanying text.
116. For further discussion of the failures of the current system, see infra
notes 117–137 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the benefits that
could be gained, see infra notes 138–161 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the potential options, see infra notes 162–206 and accompanying text.
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A. Failures of the Current Income-Sharing System
The two most prominent and significant drawbacks underlying
the current system for players to share income are a lack of control
and the potential for abuse.117 Currently, Major League Baseball
and the MLBPA have no control over what occurs in this new income-sharing market.118 This is because these income-sharing businesses do not operate in connection with the players’ negotiations
of contracts, which is the traditional avenue through which the
MLBPA could exert control vis-à-vis deciding who could become an
agent.119
This is particularly problematic because the MLBPA has shown
a lack of willingness to leave its control to other entities.120 Prior to
the MLBPA taking control in 1988, agents were left to their own
devices.121 The MLBPA decided to take the opportunity to change
the status quo and created restrictions and controls over agents to
regulate who could represent players.122 Therefore, it would not be
unprecedented for the MLBPA to exert its sphere of influence over
a previously unregulated aspect of the sport.123 These players are
not under the MLBPA’s protection as a union, but they are future
union members, and at some point would be entitled to the benefit
of union representation.124 As the sole bargaining entity for major
league players, the MLBPA has a duty to ensure that its future players are not taken advantage of by harsh business practices.125 In
117. For further discussion of the failures of the current system, see infra
notes 118–137 and accompanying text.
118. See Blum, supra note 17 (“Entities such as Big League Advance are not
granted any bargaining rights, and thus the MLBPA most likely doesn’t have any
control over Big League Advance.”).
119. See id. (“While they have oversight authority with respect to agents, that is
derived from the MLBPA granting certified agents certain rights that the MLBPA
has under the CBA, specifically to negotiate individual player contracts.”).
120. See James Masteralexis et al., Enough is Enough: The Case for Federal Regulation of Sport Agents, 20 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 69, 94 (2013) (stating major
sports leagues regulations are designed to ensure agents are able to competently
able to represent players).
121. See id. (“The MLBPA Regulations Governing Player Agents were first
promulgated in 1988 by the MLBPA’s Executive Board.”).
122. See id. at 95 (noting MLBPA required all agents to recertify after major
overhaul of regulations in 2010).
123. For further discussion of how the MLB began certifying agents, see supra
notes 120–122 and accompanying text.
124. For further discussion of MLBPA hesitation towards representing minor
league baseball players, see supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
125. See 2017–2021 MLB-MLBPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, art. II,
available at https://d39ba378-ae47-4003-86d3-147e4fa6e51b.filesusr.com/ugd/
b0a4c2_95883690627349e0a5203f61b93715b5.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NJNZH7Y] (last visited Aug. 27, 2021) (“The Clubs recognize the Association as the
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fact, one agent, Scott Boras, counsels his clients to reject any deals
offered by these companies.126 Mr. Boras is additionally attempting
to recommend a solution whereby the MLBPA operates and regulates a system similar to that run by outside investment
companies.127
BLA tends to target foreign players, which intrinsically can lead
to some abuse in how income-sharing deals are structured and negotiated.128 The Mejı́a lawsuit illustrates how this industry exploits
players who are simply attempting to act in their best interests and
get a head-start in their professional careers.129 However, the Mejı́a
case is complicated because Mejı́a has dropped the suit and recanted what he alleged in the lawsuit.130 Nonetheless, the documents that have been revealed paint a troubling picture.131
In the lawsuit, Mejı́a made several startling accusations.132
First, Mejı́a alleged that no translator was present when reviewing

sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent for all Major League Players, and
individuals who may become Major League Players during the term of this Agreement, with regard to all terms and conditions of employment, provided that an
individual Player shall be entitled to negotiate in accordance with the provisions
set forth in this Agreement (1) an individual salary over and above the minimum
requirements established by this Agreement and (2) Special Covenants to be included in an individual Uniform Player’s Contract, which actually or potentially
provide additional benefits to the Player.”).
126. See Blum, supra note 17 (stating Boras recommends none of his clients
sign income equity deal).
127. See id. (“Boras has a plan for a model where a player would be able to
give up a percentage of income in exchange for upfront money in a plan that
would be sent to the players’ association for approval.”).
128. See id. (stating BLA particularly looks for Latin American players, then
attempts to entice them with cheaper deals, hoping they land at least one of
them).
129. See Archer, supra note 102 (“The complaint said the fund, founded by
Schwimer, makes a practice of approaching ‘young, uneducated and unsophisticated’ minor league prospects with offers of cash advances in exchange for a percentage of future earnings.”).
130. See Jerry Crasnick, Padres Catcher Francisco Mejı́a Drops Lawsuit Over Earnings Cut, ESPN (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/
24523401/padres-catcher-francisco-mejia-drops-lawsuit-disputed-payment [https:/
/perma.cc/JT34-UXE6] (reviewing Mejı́a’s statement where he said BLA never
“deceived” him).
131. For further discussion of the issues presented at Mejı́a’s contract negotiation, see infra notes 132–137 and accompanying text.
132. See Archer, supra note 102 (“The suit claims Mejı́a — who it said spoke
no English at the time, had a ninth-grade education and need for money to pay for
medical treatments for his ailing mother — signed three contracts with BLA in the
fall and winter of 2016 for escalating amounts of cash and future earnings
percentages.”).
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the contracts he signed.133 Second, BLA paid the attorney representing the players at BLA contract signings, creating an inherent
conflict of interest.134 Third, BLA representatives threatened Mejı́a
when he did not pay what he allegedly owed to BLA.135 The thrust
of Mejı́a’s argument was that BLA negotiated and structured an unconscionable contract.136 Together, these allegations highlight a
significant prospect of abuse by these companies in how they approach these players.137
B. Benefits of Implementing an Income-Sharing System
The MLBPA could seize numerous benefits by taking control
over this new industry.138 Control is one of the most important factors in any business.139 Whenever a company has a position, it can
influence what the industry standard will be.140 By influencing control over the industry, the MLBPA could help increase the bare requirements that each contract would require.141 By raising the
standards within their business, minor league players would likely
feel more comfortable, protected, and represented in considering
133. See Complaint ¶ 19, Francisco Mejı́a v. Big League Advance Fund I, L.P.,
No. 1:18-cv-00296 (D. Del. Feb. 21, 2018) (complaining interpreter was not there
when deal was signed).
134. See id. ¶ 20 (“On information and belief, BLA hired and paid for an
attorney to ‘represent’ Plaintiff; however, this lawyer served as BLA’s lawyer, not
Plaintiff’s.”).
135. See id. ¶ 21 (complaining BLA threatened legal action against Mejı́a, BLA
also threatened to stop him from playing baseball again if he did not pay them).
136. See id. ¶ 23–26 (“BLA representatives threatened to sue Plaintiff and prevent him from playing baseball if he did not pay under the contract. BLA representatives also attempted to have Plaintiff give up even more of his earnings for
more money, but he refused.”).
137. For further discussion of claims raised in the complaint, see supra notes
132–136 and accompanying text.
138. For further discussion of the potential benefits that could be realized by
the MLBPA, see infra notes 139–161 and accompanying text.
139. See James Chen, Corporate Governance, INVESTOPEDIA (July 4, 2021), https:/
/www.investopedia.com/terms/c/corporategovernance.asp [https://perma.cc/
FDC6-TDEV] (“Corporate governance is the structure of rules, practices, and
processes used to direct and manage a company.”).
140. See What Is the Relevance of “Industry Standards” Under the Law?, HG, https:/
/www.hg.org/legal-articles/what-is-the-relevance-of-industry-standards-under-thelaw-36794 [https://perma.cc/3T7W-8UY7] (last visited Sept. 22, 2021) (“It creates
a means to communicate simply and concisely, and allows those within the industry to develop goals both internally and with their business trading partners.”).
141. See id. (discussing importance of industry standards, including how they
send signals to market); see also Chen, supra note 139 (discussing how corporate
governance is controlling factor for businesses operations). For further description of the issues found in the current system because of a lack of control, see supra
notes 120–127 and accompanying text.
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income-sharing agreements without threat of exploitation.142 Additionally, implementing its own income-sharing system would leave
the MLBPA better positioned to protect its future members.143
While the MLBPA does not know if every person who receives a new
contract will be its prospective member of the association, it is still
advantageous for minor leaguers to experience competition in the
industry which will lead to improved contract terms.144 The protections given through operating its own business, such as ensuring
players are adequately represented during the negotiation, can offset some of the fears.145 While the MLBPA’s company will not be
giving money away for free, it can ensure the market is competitive
to ensure players receive more for less.146
Another benefit that MLBPA could receive from implementing
a plan would be improving the growth of the sport.147 Helping provide minor league players with a more significant source of income
so they do not live in terrible conditions can only further benefit
the sport.148 The MLBPA’s decision to not collectively bargain for
and represent minor league players has left some players facing
harsh working and living conditions.149 Moreover, minor leaguers’
142. See Kevin Kerridge, 5 Factors That Cause Customers to Leave Your Business
(And How to Stop Them), INC., https://www.inc.com/kevin-kerridge/switcher-psychology-how-to-gain-customers-from-competitors-while-keeping-your-own.html
[http://web.archive.org/web/20220331141816/https://www.inc.com/kevin-kerridge/switcher-psychology-how-to-gain-customers-from-competitors-while-keepingyour-own.html] (last visited Mar. 10, 2022) (discussing factors influencing customers to switch businesses).
143. For further discussion of how the MLBPA does not represent minor
league baseball players, see supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
144. See Umberto Fedeli, Three Strategic Ways Businesses Compete, SMART BUS.
(Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.sbnonline.com/article/three-strategic-ways-businesses-compete/ [https://perma.cc/8KJM-U3N8] (finding “customer service,” “innovation,” “best price, best value, [and] low cost” are important ways businesses
compete). For further discussion of concerns over how players are being treated,
see supra notes 128–137 and accompanying text.
145. For further discussion of the allegations in the complaint, see supra notes
128–137 and accompanying text.
146. See Jason Saltzman, Why Competition is Good, ENTREPRENEUR (Oct. 28,
2014), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/239043 [https://perma.cc/5EWJZD5P] (stating competition is good because it creates better product in long run).
147. For further discussion of how growth could occur, see infra notes
148–153 and accompanying text.
148. See Dirk Hayhurst, An Inside Look into the Harsh Conditions of Minor League
Baseball, BLEACHER REP. (May 14, 2014), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/
2062307-an-inside-look-into-the-harsh-conditions-of-minor-league-baseball [https:/
/perma.cc/A8NN-65MC] (discussing conditions endured by one minor league
baseball player stating his monthly pay was as low as $300 per month after “housing, taxes, clubhouse dues and insurance were taken out . . . .”).
149. See Pannullo, supra note 27, at 444 (“Although minor leaguers are not—
and never have been—part of the MLBPA bargaining unit . . . .”).
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low wages compared to their major league counterparts have not
helped provide these players a steady, strong, or reliable source of
income.150 However, by creating new competition in this industry,
the MLBPA could help younger, ambitious players receive the
money they need to succeed in reaching the major leagues.151
MLBPA intervention would also directly benefit the players in receiving more favorable contract terms.152 This would help the future of the sport as these players could experience an improvement
in their overall working conditions.153
One additional benefit of the MLBPA stepping up to the plate
would be creating a new source of income for older players either
through the use of pension monies or the players themselves investing into a hedge fund.154 These players would receive new diversified investments with a return that has been shown possible in a
different context.155 By providing a new investment instrument for
current players and former players, they will be able to invest their
monies and see that return.156 Either way, MLBPA intervention
would provide financial security and economic certainty to both
150. See MLB Raising Minimum Salary for Minor Leaguers in 2021, APNEWS (Feb.
14, 2020), https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/28702734/mlb-raising-minimum-salary-minor-leaguers-2021 [https://perma.cc/44N7-8N9S] (laying out minimum pay for each level of minor league baseball was Rookie ball at $400 per-week,
single-A at $500 per-week, double-A $600 per-week, and Triple-A $700 per-week
while explaining minor league players are paid for five months of year).
151. See Rosenthal, supra note 9 (“He said after signing with BLA that he
wanted to hire a personal trainer, eat better food and get a better apartment. He
used the money to upgrade not only his training regimen in the U.S., but also his
offseason practice field in his native Dominican Republic.”).
152. See Blum, supra note 17 (stating system could be implemented where cost
to player is limited through loan based repayment).
153. See Pat O’Donnell, The Effect of Income and Working Conditions on Job Satisfaction, THE COLL. OF N.J. 1, 5 (May 18, 2015) (“Clark (1996) also found that overall job satisfaction included every variable used in the study, and found that
income is correlated with overall job satisfaction.”); see also Jack Harris, One Pitcher
Fights for a Better Life for Fellow Angels Minor Leaguers. It’s Working, L.A. TIMES (Sept.
15, 2021), https://www.latimes.com/sports/angels/story/2021-09-15/angels-minor-leagues-kieran-lovegrove-players-living-conditions [http://web.archive.org/
web/20220331142315/https://www.latimes.com/sports/angels/story/2021-0915/angels-minor-leagues-kieran-lovegrove-players-living-conditions] (stating minor
league players often live paycheck to paycheck because of low pay they receive).
154. See Brian Barnier, Hedge Fund, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 4, 2021), https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hedgefund.asp [https://perma.cc/65RW-R2KW]
(“Hedge funds aim for the greatest possible returns and take the greatest risks
while trying to achieve them.”).
155. See Moore, supra note 88 (discussing potential return on investment from
agreements comparable to what BLA does).
156. For further discussion of how a new investment instrument could be created, see infra notes 162–179 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol29/iss2/8

20

Thomas: Fastball Down the Middle- How Major League Baseball's Players Ass

2022]

FASTBALL DOWN

THE

MIDDLE

495

more established major league players and younger minor league
players.157
These benefits show why the MLBPA should look towards creating a system analogous to that gaining popularity throughout the
sports world, but with more constraints and direct regulation.158 By
acting now, the MLBPA could help not only its current members,
but its future members as well.159 They can help secure the game’s
future through an action other than collectively bargaining on behalf of minor league players.160 Most importantly, they could exert
their control over the industry to improve the conditions in this
expanding market.161
C. The MLBPA’s Potential Options
For the MLBPA to compete with already-existing funds, the
MLBPA would need to maintain compliance with applicable laws
and regulations and establish terms that reasonably and meaningfully compete with these businesses.162 The MLBPA could create its
own company or institute a subsidiary of the MLB, like MLB Players, Inc.163 The MLBPA would also receive several benefits from

157. For further discussion of the logic on why MLBPA intervention would
make players more secure, see supra notes 154–156 and accompanying text.
158. For further discussion of both the shortcomings of the MLBPA’s current
position on income-sharing contracts and the benefits of MLBPA intervention in
this growing trend, see supra notes 117–157 and accompanying text.
159. For further discussion of the ability of the MLBPA to help minor league
players, see supra notes 147–153 and accompanying text. For further discussion of
the MLBPA excluding the same minor leaguers from current representation who
will be their future members, see supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
160. For further discussion of how minor league players’ interests are not represented by the MLBPA, see supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
161. For further discussion of controlling such a business and how that would
allow the MLBPA to impact how the sector operates, see supra notes 138–146 and
accompanying text.
162. See Cheryl Conner, The ‘8 Great’ Challenges Every Business Faces (And How
To Master Them All), FORBES (Mar. 4, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/cherylsnappconner/2013/03/04/the-8-great-challenges-every-business-faces-and-how-tomaster-them-all/?sh=6de359183891 [https://perma.cc/L3BZ-LFLH] (stating businesses need to understand regulations impacting them in order to compete).
163. See, e.g., MLB Players, Inc., MLB PLAYERS, https://www.mlbplayers.com/
mlbpi [https://perma.cc/PY9L-PRE3] (last visited Jan. 5, 2022) (“MLB Players,
Inc. is the for-profit corporate subsidiary of the Players Association. It is charged
with managing all commercial activities of the organization.”). For further discussion of potential options for the MLBPA to create its own company, see infra notes
172–179 and accompanying text.
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implementing such a business, and those benefits would pass on to
its members.164
The MLBPA would need to secure funding for the business to
avoid the pitfall of most businesses—failing for lack of sufficient
funds.165 There are several options the MLBPA could take to secure funding.166 These options include the potential to create a
stand-alone company,167 using pension fund money to fund a new
MLBPA lead company,168 or using a portion of union dues to finance the fund.169 Another option includes certifying a company
as a MLBPA certified fund.170 All these options would provide the
new company funding to invest into minor league baseball players
as they request advanced funds for a portion of their future
earnings.171
1. Normal Investment Options
One format available to the MLBPA for a company is to set up
the funding option as a typical hedge fund.172 This would be done
by seeking investors for each round of investment opportunities.173
Utilizing investment tactics like these would allow the company to
improve the fund and deliver a return on its contributors’ investments.174 The competition between the established income-shar164. For further discussion on the benefits that minor leaguers could receive
from implementation of a new system, see supra notes 138–161 and accompanying
text.
165. See Melissa Horton, The 4 Most Common Reasons a Small Business Fails, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/120815/4-most-common-reasons-small-business-fails.asp [https://
perma.cc/N9MK-THTS] (finding funding as main reason for businesses failing).
166. For further discussion of the funding options available, see infra notes
172–196 and accompanying text.
167. For further discussion of the MLBPA creating a standalone company, see
infra notes 172–179 and accompanying text.
168. For further discussion of the MLBPA potentially using pension funds to
fund a business, see infra notes 180–189 and accompanying text.
169. For further discussion of the MLPBA potentially using union dues to
fund a business, see infra notes 190–196 and accompanying text.
170. For further discussion of the MLBPA potentially using certification as a
way to influence funds, see infra notes 197–206 and accompanying text.
171. For further discussion of the feasibility and desirability of the MLBPA’s
potential options, see infra notes 172–206 and accompanying text.
172. See Troy Segal, How to Form a Hedge Fund, INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 22, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/financial-theory/11/how-to-legally-form-ahedge-fund.asp [https://perma.cc/BPC9-SCJW] (discussing process of setting up
hedge fund).
173. See id. (explaining need to attract individuals with large sums of money
to invest in fund).
174. See id. (“You’ll need to convince them to become investors by touting a
track record of repeated success with your initial funding, a clear and understanda-
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ing investment companies would create a reasonable and workable
baseline for the MLBPA hedge fund to compete.175 That baseline
would include the amount offered by the fund and the portion of
the players income that would be received by the fund.176 This option would be the most straightforward for the MLBPA, as creating
this new business would need to abide by the well-established laws
affecting hedge funds.177 On the flip side, the MLBPA would need
to ensure it did not exceed regulatory requirements to qualify as a
hedge fund type of investment in order to avoid additional compliance issues.178 There would, however, need to be additional requirements for disclosure to respective agencies whether it is the
registration of the fund itself or the advisors.179
2. Pension Funds
For the MLBPA to create and run a fund, it would need to
ensure it has the resources to operate.180 The MLBPA may be able
to get that funding from the Major League Baseball Players Pension
Plan (“MLBPA Fund”).181 The pension fund would invest money to
earn a return, meaning the MLBPA Fund could contribute funds to
MLBPA’s player investment fund subject to certain federal restrictions.182 The restrictions come mostly from ERISA, which defines
the scope of the MLBPA Fund’s manager as a fiduciary of the penble investment strategy that has a specific mandate, and a highly-skilled and experienced team on the front and back ends.”).
175. See Relevance of “Industry Standards,” supra note 140 (stating industry standards are minimum requirements needed for each business to compete in
industry).
176. See Rosenthal, supra note 9 (discussing how BLA provides certain amount
of money for each percent of future income).
177. See Segal, supra note 172 (outlining issues with forming hedge fund, state
laws that could impact it, and federal laws to be aware of).
178. For further discussion of the characteristics that elevate a hedge fund to
heightened scrutiny, see supra notes 56–68 and accompanying text.
179. For further discussion of some applicable registration requirements, see
supra notes 56–68 and accompanying text.
180. See Conner, supra note 162 (“Too often executives and small business
owners fail to focus enough on cash flow generation. In order to head off this
problem, businesses must either be adequately capitalized and must shore up cash
reserves to meet all obligations as they are needed and to handle downturns and
emergencies that may arise.”).
181. See Major League Baseball Players Pension Plan (MLBPA), SOVEREIGN
W EALTH F UND I NST ., https://www.swfinstitute.org/profile/598cdaa50124
e9fd2d05b6ee [https://perma.cc/A5KE-9XPU] (last visited Sept. 5, 2021) (outlining basic facts of pension plan).
182. See Eric Whiteside, How Do Pension Funds Work?, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 29,
2021), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing-strategy/090916/how-dopension-funds-work.asp [https://perma.cc/NE32-C9SS] (stating ERISA does not
say what pension plan can specifically invest in).
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sion fund.183 As long as the MLBPA ensures compliance with those
requirements, the pension fund could contribute its own funds to
finance the MLBPA player investment option.184
The biggest issue the MLBPA would face is ensuring the fiduciary for the fund agreed with investing in such an investment.185 Fiduciaries need to exercise control over the funds of the pension
and must be able to defend why they are making the investments
they are making.186 This means the fiduciary cannot solely perform
social investing with the pensions funds.187 There must be an actionable return the fiduciary can use as a reason to invest in the
fund.188 However, a return is possible with these types of investments, which helps the MLBPA to justify the fiduciary’s investment
and diversify into a new type of investment such as this.189
3. Union Dues
The MLBPA could also take advantage of new types of investments by diverting union dues to an income-sharing program.190
There may be some issues with diverting funds without the consent
of the players, but the MLBPA could rely on a comparable method
to work around these issues by using an opt-in option for the play183. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1) (West 2019) (requiring fiduciary to do job
in interest of participants and beneficiaries).
184. See Whiteside, supra note 182 (“An emerging trend is to put some money
into alternative investments, in search of higher returns and greater diversity.”).
185. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1) (requiring exclusive purpose to fiduciary of
providing benefits and paying expenses for plan); see also Fiduciary Responsibilities,
U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/health-plans/fiduciaryresp [https://perma.cc/S9Q5-7CVT] (last visited Sept. 5, 2021) (“The primary
responsibility of fiduciaries is to run the plan solely in the interest of participants
and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits and paying
plan expenses.”).
186. For further discussion of why the fiduciary has a responsibility to beneficiaries, see supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text.
187. See Fischel, supra note 77, at 1147 (“A principal reason most of the pressures for social investing in recent years have been directed at ERISA-exempt
funds, such as state and local pension plans and university and other charitable
endowments, is that within the universe of private pension funds that ERISA governs, the perception has been that the exclusive benefit rule forecloses the issue.”).
188. See id. (finding Department of Labor does not allow for social investing
because of sacrifice of financial return required under exclusive benefit rule).
189. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90(b) (Am. L. Inst. 2007) (stating
there is duty to diversify investments unless it is not prudent to do so under circumstances); see also Moore, supra note 88, at 25 (“The [internal rate of return]
range[s] from -7.5% to 16.5% with an average of 5.9%.”).
190. For further discussion of the MLBPA’s option to use union dues to fund
a business, see infra notes 191–196 and accompanying text.
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ers.191 This is like what unions already do in other contexts to fund
political operations.192
In the political context, the Supreme Court has found that unions are not able to use union dues for their political operations.193
Unions have instead used opt-ins to allow for those members who
are most interested in contributing to the political operations of
the union.194 They earmark those funds specifically for those political operations, and if anyone does not want to contribute to those
operations, they do not need to agree to be part of them.195 This
could be an excellent way to spur the funds necessary to start providing an income-sharing fund option to the players, by allowing
the players who have had success at the professional level the option to help benefit the future of the game.196
4. Certify a Company
Another potential option for the MLBPA to get a hold of this
market would be seeking to enact some controlling measures over
the industry similar to the MLBPA’s insertion into the previously
191. For further discussion of the laws surrounding the use of union dues, see
supra notes 79–87 and accompanying text. See also Can Union Dues Be Used for Political Purposes?, WEINSTEIN L. GRP., PLLC, https://www.twlglawfirm.com/new-yorkconstruction-accident-lawyer/can-union-dues-be-used-for-political-purposes/
[https://perma.cc/TLW4-3EYS] (last visited Sept. 23, 2021) (finding political
spending by unions is funded through voluntary donations).
192. See id. (“They get voluntary donations from both members and nonmembers. These donations are typically funneled through another organization,
like a PAC or a political advocacy non-profit.”).
193. See Commc’n Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 745 (1988) (ruling
unions need to separate out costs in connection with collective bargaining from
other activities).
194. For further discussion of how unions can fund political operations, see
supra notes 191–192 and accompanying text.
195. See James Sherk, Workers Can Opt Out of Union Dues, HERITAGE FOUND.
(July 2, 2013), https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/commentary/workerscan-opt-out-union-dues [https://perma.cc/9UWV-BNKF] (discussing union members are able to opt out of part of their union dues because of First Amendment
disagreements on how unions spend dues).
196. See Daniel R. Epstein, We Should Stop Calling Players “Millionaires”, SBNATION (July 23, 2019), https://www.beyondtheboxscore.com/2019/7/23/207
03711/stop-calling-players-millionaires-mlbpa-mlb-owners-players-strasburg-harpermachado-minor-league-pay [https://web.archive.org/web/20220320130328/
https://www.beyondtheboxscore.com/2019/7/23/20703711/stop-calling-playersmillionaires-mlbpa-mlb-owners-players-strasburg-harper-machado-minor-leaguepay] (finding there are at least 1200 players in MLBPA at any one time). For
further discussion of how current major league players’ wealth could be used to
help support minor league players, see supra notes 190–195 and accompanying
text.
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unregulated realm of agency.197 While the MLPBA does not necessarily have the same power over these companies that it had over
agents, there is still the ability to control these companies through
other means.198 One potential option is by certifying any company
that opens up its processes and procedures to the MLBPA and satisfies the MLBPA’s standards for conduct.199 By doing this, the
MLBPA would have a few benefits, the first being that the MLBPA
would not need to operate its own business.200 A second benefit
would be that any business that opens up its internal operations to
the union would then be placed under the MLBPA’s watchful eye
and close control.201
This approach could be a viable and beneficial option because
while the MLBPA does not have collective bargaining power over
these companies like it has over agents, the MLBPA would still have
the ability to put its name behind companies that comply with its
requests, giving it the benefit of its affiliation.202 The law gives
MLBPA the ability to restrict who can act as agents for the players.203 As the players associations fight to stop agent misconduct,
the MLBPA could similarly fight to counter third-party investment
companies’ misconduct perpetrated against the MLBPA’s members
and future members by certifying the companies in a nonofficial
197. For further discussion of the actions the MLBPA took to regulate agents,
see supra notes 120–122 and accompanying text.
198. For further discussion of why the MLBPA does not have legal authority
over investment funds, see supra notes 118–119 and accompanying text.
199. See 5 benefits of Professional Certifications, MBO PARTNERS (Apr. 1, 2021),
https://www.mbopartners.com/blog/how-manage-small-business/five-benefits-ofprofessional-certification/ [https://perma.cc/NB3Y-V4JY] (stating certification
shows company is committed to higher standards).
200. For further discussion of MLBPA starting its own business, see supra
notes 162–179 and accompanying text.
201. See Sam Reisman, Cannabis Orgs Launch Business Certification Pilot Program,
LAW360 (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1320009/cannabisorgs-launch-business-certification-pilot-program [https://perma.cc/27BF-W56E]
(discussing organization created in cannabis industry to provide certification to
companies and alleviate concern of state attorneys general).
202. See Richard T. Karcher, Fundamental Fairness in Union Regulation of Sports
Agents, 40 CONN. L. REV. 355, 360 (2007) (“[T]he teams ‘may not bargain with any
agent other than one designated by the union and must bargain with the agent
chosen by the union.’ ”).
203. See id. at 363 (“Initial certification requirements may include submitting
to the players association an application disclosing certain personal and financial
information, payment of fees, attending a seminar, passing an exam, having
achieved a certain level of education, or obtaining a certain level of malpractice
insurance. The unions have also established, unilaterally, regulations that all
agents must abide by in order to maintain certification and represent players.”).
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capacity.204 MLBPA certification would help keep athletes on notice as to which funds they can trust.205 While certification is not a
particularly simple process, the players association can certify by
placing its name behind certain companies and not others.206
IV. CONCLUSION
Players that have participated in these funds appear to have an
overall positive view of participating.207 Even the Mejı́a situation
resolved itself, and he recanted his story and apologized.208 These
funds do allow players to receive an upfront, life-changing amount
of money.209 However, the MLBPA frowns upon these deals because of the large amount of money a player may be missing out on
by sacrificing a portion of all future earnings.210 Agents are also
getting cut out of the negotiations because agents have had a negative view of these deals and their ramifications to the players.211
With no legislative control over these entities, the MLBPA
needs other options.212 If the MLBPA creates its own fund, it will
204. See id. at 361 (stating players associations police agents by enforcing regulations they have passed).
205. See id. at 364 (“When the unions act in this capacity they have a legitimate interest to ensure, among other things, that agents have and maintain a certain level of competency, do not charge players excessive fees, and do not violate
their fiduciary duties owed to their players.”).
206. See MLB Players, Inc., MLB PLAYERS, https://www.mlbplayers.com/mlbpi
[https://perma.cc/PG3Z-DSPK] (last visited Sept. 8, 2021) (discussing MLBPA’s
for-profit subsidiary responsible for MLBPA’s business affairs).
207. See Phil Rosenthal, Chicago White Sox DH Yermı́n Mercedes Tells HBO’s ‘Real
Sports’ About His Private Equity Backers: ‘Nobody Believed in Me at That Point. And They
Believed in Me’, CHI. TRIB. (June 22, 2021), https://news.yahoo.com/chicago-whitesox-dh-yerm-120000253.html?fr=sycsrp_catchall [https://perma.cc/7J9L-RSM3]
(discussing player felt BLA was there to support his dream).
208. See Crasnick, supra note 130 (reversing statements Mejı́a made in his
lawsuit).
209. See Darren Heitner, The Story of Big League Advance, Which Hit A Grand
Slam With Fernando Tatı́s Jr., OUTKICK, https://www.outkick.com/the-story-of-bigleague-advance-which-hit-a-grand-slam-with-fernando-tatis-jr/ [https://perma.cc/
QSU7-TWJE] (last visited Oct. 14, 2021) (“Big League Advance provides that
player with desperately coveted funds when he needs it most.”).
210. See Rosenthal, supra note 13 (reviewing MLBPA’s stance in memo written
to players not supporting BLA).
211. See Heitner, supra note 209 (“Schwimer says that he has found that
agents do not want to be realistic with their clients about the likelihood that they
will never make it to free agency at the highest level of professional baseball.
Worse, if an agent approves the deal when a player is in Minor League Baseball but
the player exceeds his expectations, then the player will likely blame the agent.”).
212. See Jeff Passan, MLBPA Continues to Fight ‘Brand Agreement’ Bill, ESPN
(June 20, 2019), https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/27089441/mlbpa-continues-fight-brand-agreement-bill [https://perma.cc/RAC5-DZ98] (stating MLBPA
is fighting passage of bill designed to regulate these businesses because MLB and
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also have to consider how to operate the fund to maximize its ability to invest in the athletes.213 Certification presents one viable way
to open up these funds to outside scrutiny and internal control.214
Either way, the MLBPA could gain some level of control over this
booming industry that is impacting its future union members.215
While this control does not foreclose the ability for players to work
with non-union backed companies, it would at least create a choice
the players could make.216 The obvious detriments to the MLBPA
would be its need to be regulatory compliant for any of these potential plans.217 Not only this, they would also need to add a new level
of business knowledge for all these activities as these are things the
MLBPA has never attempted to do.218
Overall, the MLBPA should be concerned over its future members giving up a large chunk of its potential future earnings for a
small sum, and the possible abuse players receive from these unregulated companies.219 The MLBPA starting its own business to compete against the current businesses or institute its own certification
program to certify companies that comport with its standards is a
viable response.220 Implementing one of these programs would
help the MLBPA gain control over these currently non-MLBPA-reg-

MLBPA believe it does not go far enough). It appears the bill that passed in 2019
in Delaware was never signed, meaning it never took effect. House Bill 180, DEL.
GEN. ASSEMBLY, https://legiscan.com/DE/bill/HB180/2019 [https://perma.cc/
X2B8-PR3A] (last visited Oct. 14, 2021) (showing lack of Governor’s signature on
bill).
213. For further discussion of how the MLBPA could fund a new venture, see
supra notes 172–196 and accompanying text.
214. For further discussion of MLBPA certification of funds, see supra notes
197–206 and accompanying text.
215. For further discussion of the control MLBPA could gain over the industry, see supra notes 138–146 and accompanying text.
216. For further discussion of MLBPA’s lack of ability to forbid funds from
existing, see supra notes 118–119 and accompanying text.
217. For further discussion of funds’ legal compliance, see supra notes 56–87
and accompanying text.
218. For further discussion on the history and activities of the MLBPA, see
supra notes 27–36 and accompanying text.
219. For further discussion of the issues raised against new fund companies,
see supra notes 128–137 and accompanying text.
220. For further discussion of the options proposed in this article to gain control over the income-sharing industry, see supra notes 172–206 and accompanying
text.
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ulated businesses and provide the necessary protection for its
members.221
Ryan Thomas*
221. For further discussion of the benefits the MLBPA could receive by acting
to control the industry, see supra notes 138–161 and accompanying text.
* J.D., Candidate Class of 2023, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law; I would like to thank my family, friends, and mentors for all their support
throughout my academic career. I also want to thank my mother, who is still supporting me and guiding me every day from above, I love you to the moon and
back. Finally, I would like to thank those on the Journal who helped make this
possible, Jackie Gillen, Rachel Young, Nick Burnosky, and Maddy Hewitt, thank
you for all your hard work and for helping guide me through the process.
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